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Abstract. Montenegro has passed through more than two decades of flux to reach its 
current status as a NATO member and European Union (EU) candidate. The smallest republic 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegro’s modern history has been 
characterised by both significant change (in statehood) and relative continuity (in leadership). 
The author focuses on the period between the republic’s first multi-party elections in 1990, 
through the 1997 split within the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and the May 
2006 independence referendum to the parliamentary elections of 2016 and the country’s 
ongoing political crisis, assessing the most significant political developments throughout the 
aforementioned period.  
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In May 2016, Montenegro celebrated the ten-year anniversary of the re-establishment 
of its independence, and it had been a decade in which its government faced myriad challenges. 
The referendum itself was a pivotal moment in Montenegro’s modern history and its trajectory 
since has been shaped by it. Held on 21 May 2006, the referendum sought to determine whether 
the republic would remain a partner within the state union of Serbia & Montenegro, created as 
a consequence of the March 2002 ‘Belgrade Agreement’, or become an independent state. A 
narrow majority of 55.5 % (the threshold was set at 55 per cent) of the republic’s citizens opted 
for the latter, heralding Montenegro’s re-emergence as an internationally recognised 
independent state. The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigns had been bitterly fought by the respective 
blocs advocating these options; accusations of voting irregularities, coercion of the media and 
voter manipulation were commonplace.1  Thus Montenegro entered into this new era with a 
divided body politic and embitterment among a significant minority—44.5 % of the population 
had voted to retain the joint state—, many of whom felt aggrieved by the result. 
                                                             
1 OSCE Press Release, ‘International Referendum Observation Mission: Referendum on State Status, Republic of 
Montenegro (Serbia and Montenegro), Podgorica, 22 May 2006.   
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On 3 June 2006, independence was formally declared, and Montenegro thereafter made 
notable progress, becoming a member of the United Nations (UN) and other international 
institutions while making strides toward achieving the government’s core objective, Euro-
Atlantic integration. Montenegro received an invitation to join NATO in December 2015— 
despite the lack of public consensus on the issue—, formally became part of the military 
alliance in June 2017, and continues on a positive trajectory towards EU membership, probably 
the most likely member drawn from the ‘Western Balkan Six’.2 But the referendum result 
divided the Montenegrin body politic into winners and losers, which only served to consolidate 
power in the hands of those elites that belonged to the former, particularly within the ruling 
Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista, DPS). In the wake of the 
referendum, the DPS further consolidated its position as the ‘state party’, and the opaque 
boundaries between the ruling party and the state remained.3 Opposition attempts to challenge 
this situation have, thus far, brought little success but have generated and sustained a political 
crisis that still persists. The country is now a NATO member and is moving, albeit 
incrementally, toward European Union (EU) membership – possibly by 2025. However, a 
lengthy internal political crisis, and a highly politicised trial of opposition MPs accused of 
involvement with the attempted ‘state coup’ of October 2016, continues and the Montenegrin 
political landscape remains tense and fragmented.  
 
From Multi-Party Elections to the DPS Split, 1990-97 
Montenegro’s current situation cannot be understood without addressing the republic’s 
trajectory in the decade and a half preceding the May 2006 referendum. Montenegro, as the 
smallest of the six republics of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), was 
significantly impacted by the disintegration of that state. In 1989, after a protracted economic 
crisis in which many Montenegrin enterprises failed, the so-called ‘anti-bureaucratic 
revolution’—in reality an internal coup within the ruling Montenegrin League of Communists 
(Savez komunista Crne Gore, SKCG)—brought to power younger political elites loyal to the then 
Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević.4 Under the slogan Mi znamo kako! (We know how!), the 
                                                             
2 The Western Balkan Six are: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, and 
Albania.  
3 The OSCE have also noted on more than one occasion the “continued blurring of division between the 
Montenegrin state and the governing party.” See, for example, OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Montenegro: 
Presidential Election, 6 April 2008, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 1 
September 2008, 7.   
4 Elizabeth Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, London: Hurst & Co., 2007, 432. 
In his insightful study of the anti-bureaucratic revolutions, Nebojša Vladisavljević argues that the degree of control 
asserted by Milošević might be overstated. While 1989 was a coup, it was achieved largely as a consequence of 
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‘young, handsome and intelligent’ troika of Momir Bulatović, Svetozar Marović and Milo 
Djukanović cast themselves as a new generation with novel ideas.5 In the subsequent multi-party 
elections (Montenegro’s first), the SKCG won 83 of the 125 seats in parliament, and in June 1991, 
Milo Djukanović formed his first government, becoming Europe’s youngest prime minister at the 
age of just 28.6 The party officially changed its name to the Democratic Party of Socialists—a 
largely cosmetic change. The structure of the party remained largely intact, with the offices, 
personnel, assets and funds of the old SKCG transferring smoothly to the DPS.  
The trajectory of Montenegrin politics was, however, determined by events elsewhere in 
the SFRJ. As armed conflict intensified in Croatia throughout the spring and summer of 1991, 
the Montenegrin government frequently warned of the need for its border with Croatia to be 
defended. With the beleaguered Croats already in retreat in Eastern Slavonia, a strong second 
front would put them under further pressure; a thrust from Montenegrin units on Croatia’s 
southern border could quicken Croatia’s capitulation. The pages of Montenegro’s only daily 
newspaper Pobjeda were replete with anti-Croat propaganda, and even stark warnings of 
thousands of Ustaše (Croatian fascists) amassing at the Croatian-Montenegrin border.7 The 
paper’s editorials, as part of the Rat za mir (War for Peace) propaganda campaign, featured 
numerous DPS figures making their case for war. Framed as a defensive war, Montenegrins 
were encouraged to think of themselves not as aggressors but as defenders of Yugoslavia, fighters 
against resurgent fascism, even liberators of Dubrovnik. But the subsequent ‘War for Peace’ was 
a disaster not only for Serbia, but also for Montenegro. Television images of the ‘Pearl of the 
Adriatic’ being shelled by the Yugoslav National Army formed mostly by Serb and Montenegrin 
soldiers were transmitted across the world, creating controversy and revulsion.  
The Montenegrin leadership, shaken by the course of events, sought to distance itself 
from the Dubrovnik campaign; and it was within this context that Bulatović took a significant 
political gamble. During the ‘Hague Conference’, organized by the European Community (EC) 
and chaired by Lord Peter Carrington, he boldly took a decision that would strain the consensus 
between Titograd (Podgorica) and Belgrade. The ‘Carrington Plan’ envisaged the SFRJ 
becoming a loose association of independent states that would have the status of subjects under 
                                                             
genuine mass protest and as the fact that the leadership was discredited. See Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s 
Antibureacratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. 
5 Veseljko Koprivica / Branko Vojičić, Prevrat ’89, Podgorica: Liberalni Savez Crne Gore, 1994, 341. See also 
Srdjan Darmanović, “The Peculiarities of Transition in Serbia and Montenegro,” in Dragica Vujadinović et al, 
eds, Between Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Belgrade: CEDET, 2003, 156.  
6 For a political biography of Milo Djukanović see Kenneth Morrison, ‘The Political Life of Milo Djukanović’,  
7 Živko Andrijašević, Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti, Bar: Conteco, 1999, 95.  
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international law.8 Electing to accept the plan, Bulatović announced that Montenegro would 
sign.9 For many in Montenegro, Bulatović’s actions were nothing short of treachery, and upon 
his return, he attempted to persuade delegates in the Montenegrin assembly.10 Opinion, however, 
turned sharply against him, and pressure was also applied by Belgrade. A variant of the SFRJ (a 
‘rump’ Yugoslavia) could continue to exist if two or more republics wished to remain in 
federation. On 30 October 1991, Serbia and Montenegro proposed an amendment to the 
Carrington Plan, which allowed those states that did not wish to secede from Yugoslavia to 
establish a successor federal state. Thus, plans were made by elites in Serbia and Montenegro to 
establish the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (Savezna republika Jugoslavija, SRJ), comprising 
approximately 44 % of the population and around 40 % of the territory of the SFRJ.11 Despite 
opposition protests, these plans were made public only two months before its realization; 
constitutional experts took only five days to write the new constitution, and opposition parties 
were not consulted.12  
To realize the creation of the SRJ, the Montenegrins would need to approve its creation 
by referendum. The Montenegrin government adopted the ‘Law on Referendum’ only a week 
before the vote, limiting the scope for public debate. On 1 March 1992, in a seemingly 
comprehensive outcome, an overwhelming number of Montenegrins voted to preserve union 
with Serbia. 95.7 % of those who voted chose to remain in federation with Serbia. The legitimacy 
of the referendum was brought into question, however, by the relatively low turnout of 66 %. 
Collectively, the opposition denounced the ‘Žabljak Constitution’—named after the 
Montenegrin town where the nomenklatura had met in order to create the state— arguing that it 
was an unequal construction, and that the SRJ was dysfunctional in that it comprised two federal 
units of disproportionate scale, population and economic interests, placing Montenegro at a 
disadvantage.13  
In subsequent years, the DPS remained dominant, though the relationship between the 
ruling elites in Serbia and (some) within the DPS would become increasingly strained. The two 
                                                             
8 Interview with Lord Carrington, 4 January 1995, Death of Yugoslavia Archive, Roll 73E, U-BIT, No. 121.  
9 Slobodan Vučetić, “Serbia and Montenegro: From Federation to Confederation,” in Dragica Vujadinović et al, 
eds, Between Authoritarianism and Democracy, 73.  
10 For Bulatović’s own view of these events see Momir Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja, Belgrade: Alfa, 2003.  
11 Slobodan Vučetić, “Serbia and Montenegro: From Federation to Confederation,” in Dragica Vujadinović et al, 
eds, Between Authoritarianism and Democracy, 73.  
12 Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s, London: Hurst & Co., 1999, 120. For the 
opposition protests in advance of the referendum see Srdja Pavlović / Milica Dragojević, ‘Peaceniks and 
Warmongers: Anti-War Activism in Montenegro, 1989-1995’, in Bojan Bilić / Vesna Janković, eds, Resisting the 
Evil: Post-Yugoslav Anti-War Contention, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012, 137-58.  
13 See D Vuković, ‘Onamo ili ovdje?’, Monitor, Podgorica, 17 July 1992, 13.  
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federal units had remained united through years of United Nations (UN) sanctions and the 1992-
95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with the signing of the Dayton Agreement in November 
1995, cracks started to appear in the relationship. The fuse was eventually lit by Djukanović’s 
implicit support for the Zajedno (Together) coalition-led anti-Milošević protests taking place 
throughout Serbia in the wake of the alleged electoral fraud. Djukanović was, however, more 
explicit, declaring his opposition to Milošević, and leaving little space for ambiguity or 
misinterpretation. Utilising the Belgrade weekly magazine Vreme as a forum, Djukanović 
asserted that Milošević was an ‘obsolete politician’ who lacked ‘the ability to form a strategic 
vision’.14   
A split within the ranks of the DPS emerged, with Momir Bulatović, Milo Djukanović 
and the vice-president of the DPS, Svetozar Marović, becoming increasingly divided over the 
consequences of Djukanović’s actions. Bulatović calculated that Milošević would overcome the 
crisis, while Djukanović and Marović gambled on the contrary. The split within the upper 
echelons of the DPS became so strained that on 24 March 1997, during a meeting of the main 
board, a vote was called that would ultimately determine the future direction of the party.15 
Ostensibly arranged to discuss matters pertaining to wider political, economic and social issues 
in Montenegro and the SRJ, the meeting instead became a debate on the implications of 
Djukanović’s actions.16 Following lengthy discussion and argument, the main board voted, and 
Bulatović’s pro-Milošević stance was seemingly endorsed. However, amongst the seven who 
voted for Djukanović (and amongst those who had abstained) were some of the most powerful 
individuals in Montenegrin politics.17 They would be factors in convincing wavering DPS 
members that the party’s interests were best served by supporting Djukanović. An intense 
internal party power struggle ensued.18 Djukanović applied significant pressure on those deemed 
pliable, breaking down most of those who had initially voted against him, and succeeding in 
building a powerful grouping within the DPS. Djukanović had, therefore, wrested control of the 
party in the advance of the second crucial meeting of the DPS main board on 11 July 1997.19 
During that meeting, the party confirmed Djukanović’s ascendancy.20  
                                                             
14 Velizar Brajović, ‘Interviju: Milo Djukanović’, Vreme, Belgrade, 19 February 1997, 6-9.  
15 The main board of the DPS consisted of 99 members. See Ljubisa Mitrović / Aleksander Eraković, eds., Sto 
dana koji su promijenili Crnu Goru, Podgorica 1997, 21-22.  
16 Ljubisa Mitrović / Aleaksander Eraković, eds., Sto dana koji su promijenili Crnu Goru, 1997, 21.  
17 V/J. ‘Do posljednjeg dana’, Monitor, Podgorica, 4 April 1997, 9. See also C.K., ‘Duboka privrženost 
zajedhičkoj domovini’ Pobjeda (Podgorica), 24 April 1997, 2. 
18 V.J., Ima li pilota u DPS-u’, Monitor, Podgorica, 20 June 1997, 10. 
19 Drasko Djuranović, ‘DPS iz dva dijela’, Monitor, Podgorica, 30 May 1997, 9-10.  
20 For a more detailed account of the 11 July DPS meeting see, Mitrović / Eraković, Sto dana koji su promijenili 
Crnu Goru, 337-344. 
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Following Djukanović’s successful bid for control of the DPS, both he and Bulatović 
sought to win the presidency. In the first round Bulatović won by a narrow margin of only 
2,200 votes with a 67% turnout, and thus a second round was required. In the second round, 
Djukanović gained 5,884 votes more than Bulatović (who immediately cried foul).21 Despite 
violent protests in Podgorica following the announcement of the result, the Djukanović faction 
of the DPS thereafter consolidated its position of strength, wresting control of both the party 
and DPS ‘brand’. The pro-Milošević faction, led by Momir Bulatović, left the DPS and 
established the Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička narodna partija, SNP).22 
 
The Winding Road to Independence  
A cautious platform was adopted by the post-split DPS and, at this stage, there was no 
explicitly pro-independence position advocated by the party. Instead, they affirmed their 
commitment to Montenegro’s role within the SRJ. But relations between Djukanović and 
Milošević continued to worsen following the May 1998 elections—largely fuelled by the 
election of Momir Bulatović as President of the SRJ, a development strongly opposed by the 
DPS, and a clear divide over how to deal with the growing crisis in Kosovo. In terms of the 
latter, the Montenegrin government sought to distance itself, declaring neutrality and 
advocating dialogue with Kosovo Albanians in conjunction with the EU. But continued 
military actions by Serb forces and retaliations by the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria 
Çlirimtare e Kosovës, UÇK/KLA) drove Serbia, and thus the SRJ, into inexorable conflict with 
NATO. The Montenegrin authorities were acutely aware that despite their self-proclaimed 
neutrality, Montenegro was home to strategic military sites that would be targeted as part of 
any NATO bombing campaign. While the subsequent NATO bombing of the SRJ had 
significantly less impact in Montenegro than in Serbia, the internal situation in Montenegro 
steadily worsened as a result. A continuing flow of refugees, numbering 80,000, put a 
considerable strain on the government, and as NATO bombs fell on Montenegro, Djukanović’s 
government was placed under significant pressure by both Milošević and his supporters in 
Montenegro.23 Milošević’s capitulation after 78 days of bombing dictated that Montenegro 
survived the war, despite the many risks and potential for open conflict between opposing 
                                                             
21 OSCE/ODHIR: “Republic of Montenegro: Presidential Election 5th and 18th October 1997, Final Report,” 
1997, 5. 
22 International Crisis Group, Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?, Europe Report 92, 28 
April 2000, 3. 
23 Interview with Milo Djukanović in The Fall of Milošević Archive, Roll No.1/12b, 22. 
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groups in Montenegro.24  
In the wake of the NATO campaign, Djukanović continued to make the case for greater 
independence for Montenegro. As a means of achieving this, the Montenegrin government 
created its own foreign service, adopted the Deutschmark (and later the Euro) and abolished 
the existing visa and customs regimes. But this objective was undermined by the fall of 
Slobodan Milošević following the 5 October 2000 demonstrations in Belgrade. The 
international community now encouraged the Montenegrin government to find a solution to 
their problems with Serbia, but the DPS leadership continued to pursue independence. 
Thereafter, Montenegrin politics was defined not simply by a pro/anti-Milošević dynamic, but 
by the issue of statehood. Though signing the Belgrade Agreement of March 2002, which 
initiated the creation of the ‘joint state’ of Serbia and Montenegro, the issue of Montenegro’s 
status was not brought to a conclusion. Indeed, Djukanović extracted a crucial concession—
that Montenegro could hold a referendum on independence three years from the ratification of 
the Belgrade Agreement.25  
The assassination of the Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjić in Belgrade on 12 March 
2003 sent the ‘joint state’ into something of a crisis. Just one year after the signing of the 
Belgrade Agreement, the union seemed to be drifting. The assassination and subsequent 
‘Operation Sabre’ in Serbia only served to strengthen the Montenegrin government’s claim that 
Serbia was far from ready to make the kind of democratic reforms that Djindjić himself had 
advocated. Lack of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the EU’s threat to suspend accession negotiations with the state union 
in 2005 was oft-used by pro-independence campaigners as a justification for why Montenegro 
needed to become independent. In late February 2003, just two weeks before Djindjić’s 
assassination, the ICTY’s chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, had visited Podgorica whereupon 
she had met with Milo Djukanović, who had proceeded to complain to her that then Serbian 
president Vojislav Koštunica and the army were ‘thwarting reforms and blocking Serbia and 
Montenegro’s cooperation with The Hague’. According to Del Ponte, Djukanović lamented 
that ‘Montenegro will suffer the consequences of Serbia’s failure to cooperate with the 
tribunal’. ‘Montenegro’ he said, ‘does not want to be a hostage to Serbia any longer’. Del Ponte 
added that Djukanović was also reluctant to be a witness at the Milošević trial and that doing 
                                                             
24 Srdjan Darmanović, Montenegro Survives the War, The East European Constitutional Review 8, No.3, 1999, 
12.    
25 See N.R. ‘Solana redigovao dvije platforme’, Vijesti, Podgorica, 16 March 2002, 4.  
 8 
so would ‘damage him politically in Montenegro’.26 Thus the period during which the state 
union was ‘functioning’ was one of intense activity in Montenegro, which, despite entering 
into the state union agreement seemed to be charting its own course. Advocates of 
independence, having recovered from Djukanović’s ‘betrayal’ in signing the Belgrade 
Agreement, and three subsequent presidential elections, were gaining increasing traction as it 
became evident that Montenegro being part of the joint state was not per se a major obstacle to 
the eventual scheduling of an independence referendum.  
By 2004 it was evident that the Montenegrin government would schedule a referendum. 
In November of that year they signalled that one would indeed be scheduled by early 2006. In 
late February 2005 they sent a proposal to the Serbian government that envisaged a 
transformation of the existing joint state into a union of independent states, but the proposal was 
bluntly dismissed by Vojislav Koštunica.27 As a referendum on independence became 
increasingly likely, Serbs in Montenegro, working in concert with Montenegrins living in Serbia, 
established a movement which brought unionist forces together. The result of these endeavours 
was the ‘Movement for the Joint European State of Serbia and Montenegro’ (Pokret za 
zajedničku evropsku državu Srbiju i Crnu Goru). Besides Montenegrin Serbs and Montenegrins 
living in Serbia, the majority of whom supported preservation of the union, the movement joined 
unionist political parties and their members in Montenegro, and a number of Serb/Montenegrin 
diaspora groups. Momir Bulatović’s SNP did not join, however. The movement’s objective was 
to make the strongest possible case for the preservation of the state union, to ensure that 
Montenegrins living in Serbia could vote in any future independence referendum, and to 
emphasise the brotherhood and ‘unbreakable historical bonds’ between Serbs and 
Montenegrins.28 One of the movement’s core arguments was that the Montenegrin state had been 
‘captured’ by a group of political elite members, led by Djukanović, whose objective was to 
separate Montenegro from Serbia in order to consolidate their own political and economic power, 
which, it was argued, they had been amassing since the 1997 split of the DPS. They also argued 
that the Montenegrin government were attempting to deny voting rights to Montenegrins residing 
in Serbia and, more broadly, engaged in ‘whitewashing’ symbols of Serbian identity from 
Montenegro. However, according to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report from 2005, 
preservation of the state union was not the sole motivating factor for members of the movement. 
                                                             
26 Carla Del Ponte (with Chuck Sudetic), Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals 
and the Culture of Impunity, New York 2009, 171.    
27 International Crisis Group, ‘Montenegro’s Independence Drive’, Crisis Group Report No.169, Brussels, 7 
December 2005, 8.  
28 See Draško Djuranović, ‘Terazije za krivo mjerenje’, Monitor, Podgorica, 18 February 2005, 10-11.  
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Djukanović’s eight years in power had left many of them out in the cold, and a number were 
‘anxious to have a chance to come to power and share in the distribution of wealth that is taking 
place under the current privatization drive’.29 
Conversely, the ‘Movement for a Sovereign and Independent Montenegro’ (Pokret za 
samostalnu i nezavisnu Crnu Goru) was formed in 2005, their objective being to gather pro-
independence forces, to make a robust case for independence and to generate support for the 
independence project. In so doing they were largely, if not entirely, successful. The logic for 
them was simple, if risky. Gain independence first, utilising the rather undemocratic DPS-
Djukanović power structure, and then consolidate democracy in the future. 
At this stage, however, the independence project could have easily been derailed. It 
remained unclear exactly who would be eligible to vote in a referendum and whether Serb 
political parties in Montenegro would participate. It was later agreed that they would, if the EU 
oversaw the referendum process. The EU’s position, however, was to encourage both Serbia and 
Montenegro to implement the Belgrade Agreement and to strengthen the state union’s 
institutions. To advocates of Montenegro’s independence this was seen as a paradoxical position 
for the EU to take, defending the continuation of the successor to Milošević’s construction (the 
SRJ). They perceived the state union as an imposition by the EU in cahoots with official 
Belgrade. This perception was further consolidated when, in June 2005, Vojislav Koštunica was 
received by EU Commissioner Olli Rehn in Brussels. In an effort to derail a referendum, 
Koštunica handed Rehn a list of 264,000 names: Montenegrins living in Serbia, who, Koštunica 
argued, should be permitted to vote. The EU, however, gave no official response to ‘Koštunica’s 
list’.30 
Subsequently, the right to vote in the Montenegrin referendum was given to those who  
‘normally enjoy suffrage for presidential and parliamentary elections in Montenegro: an eligible 
voter was one aged over 18 years, who held Montenegrin citizenship and who had been 
permanently resident in Montenegro for a period of at least 24 months. By law, these 
qualifications meant that an eligible voter also included any Serbian citizen with a permanent 
residence in Montenegro for the same period, as well as a Montenegrin citizen who was 
temporarily resident in Serbia or abroad but who had retained a registered permanent residence 
                                                             
29 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Montenegro’s Independence Drive’, 11.  
30 OSCE/ODHIR, ‘Republic of Montenegro: Referendum on State-Status 21 May 2006 – OSCE/ODHIR 
Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 4 August 2006, 8. For the role of diaspora in the 
Montenegrin referendum see Kenneth Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood in Post-Yugoslav 
Montenegro, London: Bloomsbury, 2018, 127-128.        
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at an address in Montenegro’.31 
 
This, of course, excluded those Montenegrins who were registered as permanently 
resident in Serbia. Montenegrins living in the United States, Australia and Germany, to name but 
a few, could, however, vote in the referendum. On 10 November 2005, the European 
Commission (EC) sent a ‘non-paper’ to the Montenegrin government cautioning that failure to 
reach a consensus on the referendum with the opposition could have ‘severely negative 
consequences for Montenegro’s future aspirations for European integration’, and that if 
Montenegro chose to leave the state union it would ‘not inherit the right to an international legal 
personality’ (the latter was, however, already enshrined in the Belgrade Agreement).32 In the 
knowledge that the existing political polarisation and the divided nature of Montenegrin society 
generally held the potential for violent conflict, the EU attempted to counter such dark scenarios 
by discouraging the Montenegrin government from seeking independence. But when it became 
evident that the latter would do so in any event, the EU reluctantly shifted into the role of arbiter 
in advance of (and throughout) the referendum process.33 They subsequently endeavoured to 
reach agreement with Montenegrin political parties over a set of rules and conditions that would 
be acceptable to all, and it proved to be pivotal. Indeed, the role of the EU would be crucial in 
reaching a consensus on the rules of the referendum itself, something which the Montenegrin 
government and opposition had been unable to achieve independently.  
The task of ensuring a smooth referendum process was awarded to a young Slovakian 
diplomat, Miroslav Lajčak, who in late 2005 was appointed as Javier Solana’s ‘Special Envoy’ 
to Montenegro.34 A fellow Slovak, František Lipka, was chosen to chair the Republican 
Referendum Committee (RRC), the body that would arbitrate in disputes throughout the 
referendum process. But while both men were well versed in the idiosyncrasies of Balkan 
politics, spoke Serbian/Montenegrin proficiently and were diplomats who came from a Slavic 
country (Czechoslovakia) that had had, in January 1993, its own ‘velvet divorce’—which had 
                                                             
31 OSCE/ODHIR, ‘Republic of Montenegro: Referendum on State-Status 21 May 2006 – OSCE/ODHIR 
Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 4 August 2006, 8. For the role of diaspora in the 
Montenegrin referendum see Kenneth Morrison, Nationalism, Identity and Statehood in Post-Yugoslav 
Montenegro, 127-128.        
32 EC Troika ‘non-paper’ of 10 November 2005, quoted in International Crisis Group, ‘Montenegro’s 
Independence Drive’, 10.   
33 The United States adopted a more hands-off approach to the issue of Montenegro’s independence. According 
to the International Crisis Group, the US Ambassador made it clear that his country would not take a position on 
Montenegro’s independence and that the US considered it to be an internal (state union) issue. See, Montenegro’s 
Independence Drive,’12. 
34 Miroslav Lajčak would, in 2007, take over from Christian Schwarz-Schilling as the international community’s 
High Representative (HR) for Bosnia in Herzegovina in early 2007.  
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led to the Czech Republic and Slovakia becoming independent states—reaching agreement 
proved problematic, impeded from the outset by fundamental disagreements about what level of 
majority would be legitimising the outcome of the referendum. Both men would, however, 
subsequently play a pivotal role in reaching a basic consensus between Montenegro’s polarised 
political elites before the referendum and continue to do so throughout the referendum process.  
The EU’s first intervention was to challenge Montenegro’s ‘Law on Referendum’ dating 
from February 2001, which stipulated that the referendum result would be valid if one bloc 
received (one vote) more than fifty percent of the registered electorate.35 To clarify the imposition 
of standards with regard to the referendum the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) tasked the so-called Venice Commission (VC) with providing expert-informed 
recommendations on the referendum process, which by December 2005 they had completed. The 
VC is the commonly-used name for the European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(ECDTL), i. e. the constitutional arm of the Council of Europe. Thereafter, it was agreed in 
February 2006 that for the referendum result to be deemed legitimate, 55 % of the valid votes 
must be cast in favour of either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ option, and that at least 50 % (plus one) of the 
Montenegrin electoral body (i. e. all registered voters) must cast their votes. On the basis of this 
rather novel imposition, the Montenegrin government adopted a new ‘Law on the Referendum 
on State Legal Status’ on 1 March 2006.36 Furthermore, the Law on the Referendum also 
finalised the referendum question itself: ‘Do you want the Republic of Montenegro to be an 
independent state with full international and legal personality?’  
With these parameters established, pre-referendum campaigns now de facto commenced. 
In preparation for the referendum, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (OSCE/ODHIR) established a Referendum Observation Mission (ROM) to observe the 
campaign and the voting process. Two administrative bodies worked alongside the Republican 
Referendum Committee (RRC), and these were composed of twenty-one municipal referendum 
commissions (MRCs) and 1,118 polling boards (PBs). Membership of each body was distributed 
equally between pro-independence and unionist political actors. Two commissions were also 
established (again, with a balanced membership) to monitor the media and campaign financing. 
 
The Independence Referendum Campaign 
                                                             
35 See OSCE, ‘Assessment of the Referendum Law: Republic of Montenegro, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 
Warsaw, 6 July 2001.  
36 OSCE/ODIHR, ‘Referendum Observation Mission 2006, Republic of Montenegro (Serbia and Montenegro), 
Interim Report 1’, Podgorica, 28 March - 20 April 2006. 
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The pro-independence and unionist blocs began their respective referendum campaigns 
in early May 2006. The referendum environment was marked by a generally peaceful political 
process. Both sides respected competing arguments and the right to convey them, and aside from 
a few minor incidents, the respective pro-independence and unionist campaigns were conducted 
in a generally positive spirit.37 Not unfamiliar with this territory—the DPS had mastered the art 
of campaigning during the late 1990s—the pro-independence campaign proved to be rather 
impressive, excellently planned and delivered, even aesthetically seductive. The first of the pro-
independence rallies was, appropriately, held in the historical capital of Cetinje. The pro-
independence campaign was also notable for its inclusion of ethnic minorities. The DPS-led 
government had forged stronger links with Muslim/Bosniak and Albanian parties, since the latter 
had in 1997 joined Djukanović’s anti-Milošević coalition. Unlike the unionist bloc, who aimed 
their campaign almost exclusively at ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins, the DPS’ emphasis was 
placed quite significantly on the participation of Montenegro’s ethnic minorities, as they were 
almost certain that they would garner significant support from them. Demonstrative of the 
strategy of incorporating minorities and minority concerns was the nature of the campaign 
literature and television advertising. The pro-independence campaign literature specifically both 
used Albanian and Serbian (Latin and Cyrillic) language and conveyed the message that an 
independent Montenegro would be a democratic, multiethnic state. In predominantly Orthodox 
areas ‘Da’ (Montenegrin/Serbian for ‘Yes’) posters were omnipotent, while in predominantly 
Albanian areas posters adorned with ‘Po’ (Albanian for ‘Yes’) were ever-present. It proved 
something of a master stroke. 
The unionist bloc brought together all of those parties who supported union. Beyond 
the SNP, these were the Serbian People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka, SNS), the People’s 
Party (Narodna Stranka, NS), and the Democratic Serb Party (Demokratska srpska stranka, 
DSS). They engaged the Belgrade-based PR agency Incognito to direct their campaign. The 
commonality was their Serb identity, but much of the unionist campaign focused upon what 
they argued was the corrupt character of Montenegro’s government, placing particular 
emphasis on Milo Djukanovic’s links with organised crime and playing on fears that he and 
his DPS associates would, in the event of independence, transform Montenegro into a ‘private 
state’ within which his opponents would be economically and politically marginalised.38 The 
cornerstone of the unionist arguments were that Serbia and Montenegro in union were a 
                                                             
37 See OSCE/ODHIR, ‘Republic of Montenegro: Referendum on State-Status 21 May 2006 – OSCE/ODHIR 
Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 4 August 2006, 9. 
38 See G.N. ‘Djukanović: U nezavisnoj Crnoj Gori niko neće biti poražen’, Pobjeda, Podgorica, 17 May 2006, 3.  
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stronger economy than the sum of their parts, that there were strong cultural bonds between the 
republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and that Serbs and Montenegrins possessed strong, indeed 
unbreakable, ethnic and historical bonds. Economic issues really were at the heart of their 
campaign, issues of tax, corporate registration, property ownership rights, citizenship, 
pensions, and health-care provision being predominant. 
While the unionist bloc rightly acknowledged the importance of the youth vote, they 
nevertheless directed their campaign primarily at the Serb and Montenegrin communities. 
Typically, they drew most of their support from the northern Montenegrin municipalities and 
thus their campaign was primarily aimed at the Orthodox populations of those areas. This on the 
whole rather narrow focus defined their campaign, and while they could guarantee they would 
receive the votes of Montenegro’s Serbs, their message held little attraction for Muslim/Bosniak 
or Albanian voters. In any event, unionist promotional material was written only in Cyrillic script. 
But the unionists did endeavour to run a positive and moderate campaign. Indeed, unlike previous 
election campaigns, symbols of Serbian nationalism were largely absent. Instead, unionist 
politicians focused on what they argued were the benefits for retaining the union with Serbia. 
Economic, cultural, and historical reasons were most frequently cited, and while the majority of 
the unionist campaigning focused substantially on these justifications, personal attacks against 
Milo Djukanović were commonplace throughout.  
On the eve of the referendum the leaders of both blocs underlined the importance of the 
referendum being conducted in a peaceful manner, and that the outcome, whatever it may be, 
should be respected.39 On referendum day itself turnout was high (estimated to be 86 per cent), 
and there were long queues at a number of polling stations, with some citizens waiting for hours 
to cast their votes. The referendum was monitored by the OSCE/ODHIR’s Referendum 
Observation Mission (ROM) alongside observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
(OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (CLRAE), and representatives from the 
European Parliament (EP). These bodies collectively formed the International Referendum 
Observation Mission (IROM).40 A few very minor irregularities occured, as OSCE observers 
reported suspicious activities which may have indicated vote-buying schemes on the part of the 
pro-independence bloc, as well as some issues with unsealed ballot boxes, and a number of 
instances where voters were observed taking photographs of their marked ballot papers. Beyond 
                                                             
39 V. Žugić, ‘Neka 22. maj bude evropski i miran’, Vijesti, Podgorica, 18 May 2006, 2.  
40 OSCE/ODHIR, ‘International Referendum Observation Mission: Referendum on State Status, Republic of 
Montenegro (Serbia and Montenegro), Podgorica, 22 May 2006.  
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this, the day passed without more significant difficulties.41 There was, of course, the thorny issue 
of the possibility that the referendum result could fall between 50 and 55 % – the so-called siva 
zona (grey zone). Such a result would mean that there was no clear resolution to the ‘statehood 
question’ and that both pro-independence and unionist supporters would take to the streets 
claiming victory, raising the possibility of violence and instability.    
When polling stations closed at 9 p.m., the air was thick with tension and anticipation. 
Preliminary results and a forecast of the final result were announced just thirty minutes after the 
polls had closed by the NGO Centre for Monitoring and Research (Centar za monitoring i 
istraživanje, CEMI). CEMI carefully selected initial reports from polling stations throughout 
Montenegro to represent the overall electorate as closely as possible. The NGO Centre for 
Democratic Transition (Centar za demokratsku tranziciju, CDT), perhaps having seen the chaos 
caused by the preliminary results given by CEMI, chose a more cautious approach. Their 
spokesperson, Milica Kovačević, stated that, ‘We are of the opinion that the referendum 
commission should be allowed to complete its work and count all ballot papers. The projections 
show a very tight result. The CDT does not want to contribute to confusion’.42 Though only 
preliminary results, CEMI’s announcement brought pro-independence supporters on to the 
streets, where they let off fireworks and, on occasion, fired pistols into the air. The leader of the 
unionist bloc, Predrag Bulatović (SNP) appeared on television appealing for calm and imploring 
unionists and their supporters not to be intimidated by the hasty celebrations of the pro-
independence bloc. ‘All citizens of Montenegro’, he said, ‘must maintain peace and demonstrate 
tolerance and patience’, adding that ‘the result of the referendum is not final until the political 
parties on both sides accept it’.43 Nevertheless, the celebrations continued unabated and by 11 p. 
m. it became evident that the pro-independence bloc had indeed triumphed, albeit by a tiny 
margin. At 4 a.m. on 22 May 2006 Milo Djukanović gave a victory speech to DPS members in 
the government building before stepping outside to address the crowds who had assembled 
outside. There he officially declared victory and, somewhat controversially, congratulated Serbia 
on their own independence.44 The following morning, František Lipka, the chair of the RRC, 
announced the first official (but still preliminary) results: the total turnout was estimated at 86.3 
%; 55.5 % had voted in favour of independence and 44.5 % in favour of the preservation of the 
                                                             
41 International Referendum Observation, 8. 
42 Statement by CDT, broadcast on Radio Televizija Crne Gore (RTCG) 21 May 2006.  
43 Statement by Predrag Bulatović on RTCG 1, broadcast on Radio Televizija Crne Gore (RTCG), 21 May 2006. 
44 Speech by Milo Djukanović on RTCG1, broadcast on Radio Televizija Crne Gore (RTCG), 22 May 2006. See 
also N.R. ‘Djukanović: Srbijo, srećna i tebi nezavisnost’, Vijesti, Podgorica, 22 May 2006, 3.  
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state union. The ‘grey zone’ had been avoided by only 0.5 %.45 On 27 May the RRC confirmed 
the official result, based on a total turnout of 86.49 %.46 The unionist bloc continued, however, 
to argue that there were irregularities with voting procedures on the day, but the RRC again 
reiterated the results for a final time on 31 May 2006, while the OSCE, upon the publication of 
their subsequent final referendum observation report confirmed that the referendum was 
‘conducted in line with OSCE and other international standards related to democratic electoral 
processes’.47  
 
Post-Referendum Montenegro  
Following the May 2006 referendum and the subsequent declaration of independence, 
the governing DPS, their coalition partners, the SDP and others comprising the ‘Movement for 
a Sovereign and Independent Montenegro’, basked in their glory. The government benefited 
from a lengthy post-referendum honeymoon, boosted by high levels of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), accompanied by a rapid (and often brash) process of privatisation that 
created an expanding stratum of nouveau riches.48 The opposition seemed demoralised and 
directionless as it stumbled into the new reality, as the DPS and their allies enjoyed the spoils 
of victory. Essentially a ‘party of power’ (and in power since 1990), it continued to grow 
stronger in the immediate post-referendum period. The DPS, it should be acknowledged, is 
more than merely a political party; it is a mechanism through which members advance their 
political and economic interests. Those outside the DPS or those that do not have veze 
(connections) with it, are at a disadvantage. Moreover, the power of the DPS’s figurehead, 
Milo Djukanović, appeared unassailable. His instinct for political survival, and his ability to 
outmanoeuvre his political opponents, remained as sharp as ever—though he temporarily 
‘retired’ from politics in 2006, passing the reins to the DPS stalwart, Željko Šturanović. 
However, following a difficult period for Šturanović in the wake of the outbreak of global 
economic crisis, Djukanović returned to take on the role of prime minster again in February 
2008.49  
                                                             
45 Statement by František Lipka (Chairman of the RRC), broadcast on Radio Televizija Crne Gore (RTCG), 22 
May 2006. 
46 International Crisis Group, ‘Montenegro’s Referendum’, 12. 
47 OSCE/ODHIR, ‘Republic of Montenegro: Referendum on State-Status 21 May 2006 – OSCE/ODHIR 
Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 4 August 2006, 1. 
48 See Kenneth Morrison, ‘Change, Continuity and Consolidation: Assessing Five Years of Montenegro’s 
Independence’, LSEE/LSE Papers on Southeast Europe, February 2011, 23.  
49 Zoran Radulović, ‘Na prijestolu višestruki povratnik’, Monitor, Podgorica, 29 February 2008, 8-10. 
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Throughout this period Montenegro made significant progress in their government’s 
stated goal of joining the European Union. In June 2006, the EU established relations with 
Montenegro, and all member states recognised the country’s independence. Just over a year 
later, in October 2007, Montenegro signed a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA). A 
formal application was submitted in December 2008, and the country’s endeavours were 
rewarded in December 2009 when Montenegrin citizens were granted visa-free travel within 
the Schengen zone; an important development because it provided tangible evidence that the 
government’s endeavours were bearing fruit. In November 2010, the European Commission 
published its avis (opinion) on the country’s bid to become a candidate for membership, and in 
December 2010, Montenegro was formally awarded candidate status. In December 2011, the 
European Commission began the accession process, and membership negotiations began on 29 
June 2012.  By 2014 two chapters had been provisionally closed: those focusing on ‘education 
and culture’ (Chapter 26) and ‘science and research’ (Chapter 25).  
Domestically, there were also significant developments. On 21 December 2010, 
Djukanović announced that he would once more step down as prime minster, with the mandate 
passing to the finance minister (and deputy prime minister), Igor Lukšić. Djukanović, however, 
remained the chairman of the DPS, ensuring that he kept control of the internal party discipline. 
But following the parliamentary elections of 2012, during which he played a significant role in 
the campaigning, giving speeches in all municipalities of Montenegro in the run-up to election-
day, Djukanović once more announced his return as prime minister. He thus led a DPS coalition 
government that also included the Bosniak Party (Bošnjačka stranka, BS) and the Croatian 
Civic Initiative (Hrvatska građanska inicijativa, HGI).  
It may have been the narrow margin of victory that led Djukanović to assess that he 
was indeed much better placed to assert influence over the government as prime minister, rather 
than as simply chairman of the dominant party within it. Moreover, the continued dominance 
of the DPS was, to some extent, being challenged by the formation of the Democratic Front 
(Demokratski front, DF), a centre-right coalition, comprising the New Serb Democracy party 
(Nova srpska demokratija, NOVA), the Movement for Change party (Pokret za promjene, 
PzP), and several senior renegade SNP officials, that had increased in popularity, primarily due 
to the surprising degree of public support for their presidential candidate, Miodrag Lekić, who 
previously had served as foreign minister and as the Yugoslav Ambassador in Rome.50 Lekić 
                                                             
50 M.J. ‘Profil: Miodrag Lekić’ Vijesti, Podgorica, 26 May 2013, 2. Lekić is often disparagingly referred to by 
Djukanović and by the pro-government media as ‘Milošević’s Ambassador in Rome’.   
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has been relatively successful in casting himself as a defender of citizens’ rights, attacking the 
government on every issue from VAT increases to their record in combating corruption and 
organised crime.  In the April 2013 presidential elections, Lekić won an impressive 48.8 % of 
the vote, losing only marginally to the DPS candidate, Filip Vujanović, who won 51.2 %.51     
The DF’s rise was somewhat demonstrative of a potential shift in the distribution of 
power among the opposition parties. The narrow margin of the defeat had demonstrated that 
the DF, certainly under Lekić’s stewardship, was a credible and ascendant political force. 
Despite the DF’s notable early successes, however, cracks soon began to appear. Speculation 
that Lekić disliked the hard-line positons that NOVA adopted vis-à-vis Serb national issues 
had been abundant throughout the DF’s rapid ascendancy, but strains within the DF were 
evident by 2014. Indeed, after internal disagreements over the direction of the coalition, Lekić 
departed in March 2015 to form his own party Demokratski savez (Democratic Union, known 
more commonly as DEMOS), taking a number of key DF members with him, including Goran 
Danilović, the former vice president of NOVA. The DF, after the departure of Lekić, did not 
possess the level of support that its original incarnation enjoyed, but his departure allowed the 
more radical elements within the DF to re-orient the coalition to a more radical position that 
would have been impossible under Lekić’s leadership. So though seemingly weakened as a 
political force, they changed direction, opting not to challenge the DPS within the parliament 
but to resort to a parliamentary boycott and to a return to the ‘politics of the streets’.  
 
The Democratic Front and the ‘Politics of the Streets’ 
The DF began their round-the clock anti-government protests, which, of course, the 
government deemed ‘unlawful’, on 27 September 2015 by erecting a ‘tent city’ outside the 
parliament building, which organisers described as the ‘first free territory in Montenegro’.52 
Behind the scenes, DF activists were endeavouring to give the protests a distinct ‘brand’. Under 
the banner Sloboda traži ljude (Freedom Seeks People), they launched a dedicated website 
(slobodatraziljude.me), a Facebook page and a Twitter account (FreedomCalling.me), their 
stated aim being to ‘crowd-fund the revolution’, a rather innovative initiative and certainly 
novel in the Montenegrin context.53 This and other—somewhat opaque—means of funding 
proved successful enough for the DF, if nothing else, to purchase a large number of tents in 
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52 Darvin Murić, ‘Pat pozicija na bulevaru kod Skupštine’, Vijesti, Podgorica, 4 October 2015, 3.  
53 For information on ‘crowd funding’ see the Sloboda traži ljude website: http://slobodatraziljude.me/doniraj/ 
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advance of their protests. The Montenegrin government, and media close to them, claimed the 
DF was, in fact, funded by a network of Serb nationalists with ties to Russia.54 Undeterred, the 
leadership of the DF declared that the protests were not anti-NATO, that they were seeking fair 
elections, and would continue their protests until the government resigned and a ‘technical 
government’ was installed to oversee preparations for Montenegro’s ‘first free and fair 
elections’. More specific demands included the creation of an electronic electoral roll to 
prevent the manipulation of voter registration, the preparation and passing into law of 
legislation designed to mitigate the abuse of state resources for DPS supporters.55  
But such ambitious demands could only be met by mobilising sufficient numbers, and 
there was little evidence to suggest that they would be able to do so. The problem was both one 
of numbers and of image. Despite the modern, social media-savvy image that the DF attempted 
to project, the organisers of the protests were well-known opposition figures with a lengthy 
record in opposing the DPS. Given their profile, it seemed improbable that they could appeal 
to an electorate beyond those who were their natural supporters, and thus equally improbable 
that they could meet their stated objectives.56 Indeed, the early stages of the DF protests, in late 
September 2015, appeared to bear this out. Though their campaign was energetic the relatively 
small numbers involved indicated that they had failed to capture the imagination of the wider 
public and thus presented little or no threat to the government, who dismissed them as 
meaningless and led by the ‘usual suspects’.57  
By 17 October 2015, the small number of tents located outside the parliament gave the 
distinct impression that momentum had stalled. Indeed, just as it appeared that the protests had 
run out of steam, after twenty days of protest, the government took the decision to clear the 
‘tent city’, on the pretext that it was an inconvenience to citizens.58 During the subsequent 
police operation minor stand-offs between police and demonstrators took place, though 
tensions quickly rose. Riot police intervened in a rather ‘heavy handed’ manner, with both DF 
activists and ordinary citizens subjected to rough treatment. In any event, the harsh nature of 
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the police operation (they would later use stun grenades and tear gas to disperse the protestors), 
while facilitating the dispersal of the protestors, played straight into the hands of the DF.   
The excessive force used by the police in dismantling the ‘tent city’ later, during the 
subsequent protests, presented the DF with the opportunity not to cast themselves as victims of 
‘police brutality’ and ‘state oppression’, but to reach out to the wider citizenry. Evidently adept 
at using social media, DF activists captured (largely on mobile phones) numerous images of 
police restraining and beating demonstrators, which were then disseminated through Facebook 
and Twitter. This worked to good effect. The vast majority of major international press 
agencies, for example, simply conveyed the DF narrative without providing much by way of 
context. Others entered the ‘debate’ following the breaking of the protests. On 17 October 2015 
Doris Pack, the EU’s former head of the European Parliament delegation for Southeastern 
Europe, wrote on her Twitter account that in Montenegro the ‘autocratic Prime Minster has set 
himself above the law, arresting peaceful protestors’. One week later, on the day of the 24 
October protests (see below), she tweeted that the protests were ‘not against NATO but against 
Djukanović’.59 The government, conversely, appeared to have no equally effective narrative to 
justify the actions of the police, and thus the images of the events of that evening changed the 
dynamics dramatically, exceeding even the expectations of the protest’s organisers. The moral 
victory—and the propaganda gains generated through the effective use of social media—was 
theirs.  
The violent removal of the tent-dwellers in front of the parliament of 17 October 2015, 
by accident or design provided the DF with an opportunity to mobilise larger numbers to their 
cause. And, indeed, on the following evening a significantly larger crowd descended on the 
Square of the Republic to demonstrate against the brutality of the police and, more generally, 
the government. The Montenegrin government were on the defensive; not close to collapse by 
any means but rattled by the course of events nevertheless. Understanding that the dynamics 
had shifted, and seeking to capitalise, the DF announced that they were giving the government 
‘six days to resign’ or large demonstrations in Podgorica would go ahead the following 
weekend.60 They called on citizens of Montenegro and opposition parties to join them. And by 
early evening on Saturday 24 October 2015 it was evident that the numbers gathered in the 
centre of Podgorica far outstripped those of previous demonstrations. Sensing that it was time 
to seize the opportunity, the DF’s leaders, perhaps themselves surprised at the scale of the 
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gathering and realising that they may never mobilise such numbers again, sought to harness 
the anger and energy of the crowd. After a series of emotive speeches, they appealed to the 
crowd to join them in marching on the Montenegrin Assembly. But though there were many 
thousand protestors present who shared feelings of discontent and a sense of injustice, what 
became equally evident was that a far smaller number would be willing to join the DF in their 
attempts to overthrow the government ‘from the streets’.61 Thus, as the rally concluded, a 
smaller, though still significant, number of protestors walked towards the parliament, 
encouraged to do so by the DF’s leaders. There, the crowd became increasingly agitated and 
the atmosphere, defiant though largely jovial just an hour before, turned darker. A small 
number of demonstrators began to throw rocks and firecrackers at the police that had encircled 
the assembly, before surging towards the police lines. Thereafter, the Special Anti-Terrorist 
Unit (Specijalna antiteroristička jedinica, SAJ) responded with tear gas and baton charges.62 
The centre of Podgorica descended into chaos. 
In the immediate aftermath the government sought to retake both the initiative and the 
moral high ground. Having been caught off-guard by the social media activism of the DF the 
previous weekend, the government ensured that they prevailed in this particular information 
war. The Montenegrin government argued that the evening’s events were an attack on the state. 
Seeking to discredit the DF, Milo Djukanović described the protestors’ actions as an attempted 
coup d’état, while stating that the DF were ‘Serbian and Russian proxies seeking to reverse 
Montenegro’s path to NATO membership and undermine’ Montenegro’s statehood.63 The 
(pro-government) daily Pobjeda claimed on 26 October 2015 that ‘Serbian and Russian 
extremists’ were providing logistical support to the DF64 and that the Serbian extreme 
nationalist groups Nacionalni stroj (National Alignment) and Obraz (Honor) had organized 
and participated in the violence.65 It should be pointed out, however, that Djukanović since has 
emphasized on numerous occasions that he believed the government in Serbia have had 
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absolutely no role in supporting the DF protests. (Indeed, both Vučić and Djukanović are close 
associates and both are advised by Vladimir Beba Popović).66 
To be sure, in seeking to harness that anger the DF miscalculated. By issuing unrealistic 
ultimatums and attempting to storm the parliament building they, within one hour, transformed 
themselves from perceived victims into perceived aggressors, and the voices and reasoned 
arguments of the more civic-oriented within the DF were immediately obscured by those with 
a more radical orientation. If the DF had been indeed capable of channelling widespread 
dissatisfaction and transforming the protests into a broader citizens’ movement, their chance 
had, most likely, gone with the wind. In the wake of the violence, the DF sought to limit the 
damage, arguing that those responsible for the violence had been ‘placed’ by Montenegro’s 
National Security Agency (Agencija za nacionalnu bezbjednost, ANB) to discredit the DF and 
undermine the legitimacy of the protests.    
In the midst of an increasingly febrile domestic political context, relations between 
Podgorica and Moscow further deteriorated as it became evident that Montenegro would 
indeed join NATO. The situation had started to worsen following the Montenegrin 
government’s support of EU sanctions against Russia in July 2014. This not only generated 
sharp criticism from the Russian Ambassador in Montenegro, Andrei Nesterenko, but from his 
counterpart in Serbia, Alexander Chepurin, who commented that the Montenegrin 
government’s attempts to join NATO were akin to ‘monkeys chasing a banana’.67 Thereafter a 
number of anti-Russian billboards appeared in Podgorica emblazoned with messages such as 
‘Better a banana in the hand than a Russian boot in the neck’, and one that drew on a quote 
from the Montenegrin communist, writer, and then dissident, Milovan Djilas: ‘Russians have 
never been friends to Montenegrins; we have always been bargaining chips to them’.68 
Thereafter, Montenegrin government claims that Russia had been behind the October 2015 
protests fuelled a further deterioration of bilateral relations.69 Yet while little concrete evidence 
was provided to prove that Russia has anything other than rhetorically supported the DF (and 
anti-NATO) protests, the Montenegrin government has not deviated from the narrative linking 
the two. Djukanović argued that Russia continued to interfere in the political life of 
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Montenegro, though stating that Montenegro’s damaged relations with Moscow was primarily 
a ‘collateral effect’ caused by current geopolitics and a reflection more of Russia’s own 
deteriorating relationship with NATO.70      
Montenegro’s formal invitation to join the NATO alliance, received on 2 December 
2015, to become NATO’s twenty ninth member, saw a shift in the DF’s strategy—with more 
focus being placed on a ‘No to NATO’ campaign, inspite of continuing to work towards 
creating the conditions for a transitional government. An anti-NATO protest went ahead in 
Podgorica on 12 December 2015, which however was organised by NOVA and thus not strictly 
by the DF. Speakers expressed outrage that Montenegrin troops may be deployed in 
neighbouring Kosovo as part of NATO-KFOR (Kosovo Protection Force). They were joined 
on stage by a ‘special guest’, the former Montenegrin president and SRJ prime minister Momir 
Bulatović, who opined that the government were forcing the country into NATO ‘to avoid 
being held responsible for their criminal activities’.71 Subsequent speakers warned of the 
possibility of an armed uprising against the government if the decision to join NATO was taken 
without a referendum.72  
 
The October 2016 Parliamentary Elections and the Alleged ‘State Coup’ 
In spite of surviving a vote of no confidence and caving-in to pressure by creating an 
‘interim government’, comprising members of opposition parties in key roles, the DPS 
prepared for Montenegro’s ‘free and fair elections’, scheduled to take place in October 2016. 
At the same time, the country celebrated the ten-year anniversary of the restoration of its 
independence. A distraction from the ongoing political crisis, it was a more muted affair than 
might have been expected. In any event, the tone and content of the pre-election campaigns 
was as anticipated. The DPS claimed that a vote for them would be a siguran korak (safe step): 
a vote for stability, economic growth, increased investment in the country’s infrastructure, and 
an affirmation of Montenegro’s independence and future integration into NATO and the EU. 
But even the upper echelons of the DPS seemed acutely aware of the potential for an uncertain 
outcome. In mitigation, they launched an energetic campaign, during which Djukanović 
warned that the stakes were high and that the DPS were faced with an opposition that was 
unpatriotic, irresponsible, treacherous and willing to ‘jeopardise public peace and order, 
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violating laws and undermining state institutions’ to gain power. He also stated that he saw no 
justification for anyone in Montenegro giving their vote to those who were trying to ‘stop 
Montenegro dead in its tracks’.73 In this regard, the DPS leadership singled-out the DF as those 
most likely to cause trouble during elections. The DF were, they argued, a dangerous and 
untrustworthy group who were not only attempting to undermine Montenegro’s sovereignty, 
but were accepting money from Russia to finance their ‘anti-Montenegrin’ and ‘anti-NATO’ 
campaign.  
Aware of growing discontent, opposition parties attempted to capitalise by emphasising 
the need for a change of government after 27 years of DPS rule, growing unemployment and 
high-level corruption. They also claimed throughout their campaign that the DPS had used state 
resources to provide various ‘incentives’ such as the writing-off of utility bills and purchasing 
identity cards to buy votes. The DF’s campaign was well organised and relatively glossy; it 
gained momentum as the election approached. According to an OSCE/ODHIR report, 
interlocutors with their own election monitors alleged that ‘the high quality and quantity of DF 
campaign materials’ was due to the coalition ‘receiving foreign funding’. The report, however, 
provided no concrete evidence of this.74 The Ključ (Key) coalition—comprising the 
Democratic Alliance (DEMOS), the SNP and the civic movement United Reform Action 
(Ujedinjena reformska akcija, URA)—claimed, for example, that the DPS had plundered 
Montenegro’s wealth and had been an abject failure in government. On the face of it, the 
opposition appeared in a strong position to challenge the DPS. If united, they could be stronger 
than the ruling party. And yet the opposition gain failed to do so when it mattered. The DF, 
Key and the newly founded split off of the Socialist People’s Party, the Democratic 
Montenegro party (Demokratska Crna Gora, DCG) implied that a post-election coalition was 
possible and that a ‘good basis’ for a ruling coalition involving opposition parties existed. For 
other opposition parties prospects were mixed: The SDP and PCG were in a fighting for their 
very survival. Conversely, they could be kingmakers, deciding whether to enter a coalition with 
the DPS or unite with in a grand coalition.  
As the election drew closer, the exchange of accusations intensified. The DPS alleged 
that the DF may, in the event of a DPS victory in the election, attempt to destabilise 
Montenegro. Djukanović warned that the government would respond firmly to ‘any attempts 
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at jeopardising public peace and order, violating law and undermining state institutions’.75 
Thereafter, the Director of the Montenegrin Police, Slavko Stojanović, announced that not only 
were the police prepared for riots during election day and after, but that his organisation 
possessed ‘operational information’ that suggested that certain (opposition) elements may 
attempt to instigate unrest and that the police were ‘prepared for such incidents’.76 In a 
surprising twist, Montenegrin police began to reveal details of what they argued was an 
attempted ‘state coup’. Just two days before the election, a former policeman, Mirko 
Velimirović, entered a police station in Podgorica and revealed that a plot to install a ‘pro-
Russian’ government had been prepared. On the basis of the information provided by 
Velimirović, Montenegrin police arrested Bratislav Dikić, a former Serbian gendarmerie 
member who, they alleged, was part of an armed criminal organization that aimed to subvert 
the election process and to attack citizens and police officers near government buildings in 
Podgorica. Dikić immediately denied involvement, claiming that he had been ‘framed’ during 
a visit to Montenegro, where he had come to visit Ostrog monastery near Nikšić on account of 
his ill-health. Ostrog monastery, set in the large rock of Ostroška Greda, is a place of pilgrimage 
for many Orthodox Christians (and of other faiths). It is known for being the location of the 
bones of Sveti Vasilije (Saint Basil) of Ostrog, and pilgrims who are suffering ill-health believe 
they can be cured or their pain eased by praying next to his body. In an interview for Dan, 
Dragan Dikić, Bratislav’s brother, claimed that his brother had gone to Ostrog for this reason 
and that he was not only ‘gravely ill’ having undergone an operation due to a form of cancer, 
but had, since the operation, difficulty speaking.77 In adition to Dikić, nineteen more Serbian 
citizens were also arrested in what the government claimed was an attempt to stage a coup 
d’état during which Djukanović would be the target of an assassination attempt.  
On polling day turnout was relatively high (compared to elections in 2009 and 2012), 
and by 8 p.m., when polling stations closed, 73.2 % of those eligible to vote had done so. The 
day was tense and not without incident, and to add to the sense of crisis, Montenegro’s Agency 
for Electronic Communications (Agencija za elektronske komunikacije, AEK) ordered all of 
the country’s three mobile operators to bar the use of the Viber and WhatsApp messaging 
services—used quite effectively by opposition parties, particularly the DF—, on the pretext 
that a significant volume of ‘spam’ was being sent via mobile networks. As early results came 
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in, it was evident that while the DPS vote did not collapse they had only achieved a relative 
majority, failing to garner enough votes to secure a parliamentary majority (41.4 % of the vote 
and 36 seats in parliament). The opposition, particularly the DF, performed well with 20.3 % 
of the vote and 18 seats, opening the possibility of a governing coalition should the DPS fail to 
secure enough support from potential coalition partners. The Key coalition secured only 11 % 
of the vote and nine seats; the DCG gained eight seats, while the SDCG won two seats.  
As the party with the largest share of the vote, it was incumbent on the DPS to attempt 
to form a governing coalition; one that would possess at least 41 of the 81 seats in the 
Montenegrin Assembly. The new government, which included many new faces, was eventually 
formed on 28 November 2016, but it was not its formation that became the Montenegrin new 
government’s primary problem, but rather claim and counter-claim over the existence of a so-
called ‘state coup’, with the Montenegrin government providing what they claimed was 
evidence of an organised coup attempt. On 17 October 2016, the Montenegrin State Prosecutor, 
Ivica Stanković, had announced that the government had ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an 
‘organised criminal group’ (comprising twenty Serbian citizens and led by Bratislav Dikić) had 
plotted to launch a coup d’état on the day of the election.78 Thereafter, the government released 
what they claimed were transcripts of a conversation between Dikić and one Aleksandar 
Sindjelić—a Serbian citizen who allegedly fought for the Novorossiya (New Russia) forces in 
Eastern Ukraine—who was accused of being one of Dikić’s co-conspirators.79 Three days later 
Montenegro’s special prosecutor for organised crime, Milivoje Katnić, appeared on the 
television programme Načisto to tell the host, Petar Komnenić, that the government had 
evidence that ‘terrorists’ had, on the evening of 16 October 2016, planned to embed themselves 
within a group of protestors assembled outside parliament, before entering the building dressed 
as police officers to take over the Montenegrin Assembly by force of arms and announce that 
the ‘party of their choice’ had won the election. Only quick action on behalf of Montenegro’s 
security services, he said, had prevented Montenegro ‘from being shrouded in black’.80 The 
reaction to Katnić’s interview was, predictably, mixed: the DF, for example, argued that there 
were many unanswered questions and that Katnić’s appearance on the show was 
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‘scandalous’.81 However, on 24 October 2016, the Serbian prime minster Aleksandar Vučić 
announced that arrests had been made in Serbia connected to the coup attempt, a development 
that appeared to lend credence to the Montenegrin government’s claims. Vučić added, 
however, that those arrested in Serbia (including three Russian citizens) appeared to be 
unconnected to those arrested in Montenegro.82  
The growing controversy was interrupted briefly with the news that Milo Djukanović 
would step down as prime minister. During the election campaign there had been no evidence 
that Djukanović had tired of frontline politics. Yet having already heavily implied that he 
considered Duško Marković to be the man to form a new government, Djukanović formally 
announced on 28 October 2016 that he would be retiring (amid denials that he was under 
pressure from the US to do so. Duško Marković, the former head of Montenegro’s state 
security, had been nominated by the main board of the DPS to succeed him.83 Dubbed by the 
opposition as the crna kutija (black box) of Montenegrin politics (or even as the ‘Putin from 
Mojkovac’), Marković’s past meant that he was both respected and feared. No-one, perhaps, 
has had his finger so firmly on the pulse of social and political developments in Montenegro, 
and while he is not a slick as Djukanović, he is, undoubtedly a shrewd and highly capable 
operator and one that can enforce discipline within the DPS.  
While Marković proceeded with the creation of a DPS-led governing coalition, the 
‘state coup’ controversy took numerous twists and turns. On 27 October 2016 Aleksandar 
Vučić revealed that the Serbian Security Information Agency (Bezbednosno-informativna 
agencija, BIA) had proof that ’certain groups’ were closely monitoring Djukanović’s 
movements, while also revealing that 125,000 euros and a number of stolen Montenegrin police 
uniforms (to be worn, allegedly, by the attackers) had been seized.84 Two Russian citizens 
(named as Eduard Vladimirovich Shirokov and Vladimir Nikolaevich Popov) who were 
alledged to have been members of Russian Military Intelligence and had been held in Serbia, 
were permitted to return to Moscow after a visit to Belgrade by Nikolai Patrushev, a senior 
Russian security official.85 However, on 1 November 2016, the above-mentioned Aleksandar 
Sindjelić turned himself over to the Montenegrin authorities, having been visited by them in 
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Belgrade during the previous week.86 However, the waters were muddied even further 
regarding Sindjelić’s role in the ‘state coup’. The leader of Serbia’s Ravna Gora Movement, 
Bratislav Živković, claimed that Sindjelić had been offering money to members of the group 
to go to Podgorica, but that many refused because it was widely suspected that he was 
cooperating with both Serbian and Montenegrin intelligence services.87 While in custody, 
Sindjelić negotiated a plea-bargain that would mean a more lenient prison sentence, if he agreed 
to provide prosecutors with specific detailes about the planning of the attack. Apparently on 
the basis of this information, the Montenegrin prosecutor, Milivoje Katnić, declared thereafter 
that a plan resembling a ‘Ukrainian scenario’ had been uncovered—whereby the attacks on the 
Montenegrin Assembly and the arrest of Milo Djukanović would be used to cause panic, unrest 
and a destablisation of Montenegro—all with the aim of halting the country’s accession to 
NATO.88 The DF’s response to this was simply that the state prosecutors were siding with the 
DPS, which had fabricated the entire case.89   
In the meantime, on 7 November 2016, the new Montenegrin government was formally 
constituted at a ceremony in Cetinje, after tough negotiations between the DPS and a number 
of minority parties. Neither the DF nor the Key members of the assembly were in attendance, 
and the DCG and SDP members were similarly conspicuous by their absence. All stated that 
they did not recognise the result of the election and that they would not return to parliament 
until the ‘state coup’ was investigated by an independent commission.90 Further developments 
in the investigation of the alleged state coup hardened their resolve to continue with their 
boycott. On 24 November 2016, Aleksandar Sindjelić, hitherto the main suspect in the ‘state 
coup’ case, was released from Spuž prison near Podgorica, having been given the status of a 
‘protected witness’ by the Montenegrin High Court, and permitted to return to Belgrade on the 
basis that he would continue to assist the prosecutors. Thereafter Montenegrin prosecutors 
applied pressure on the leaders of the DF, and the accusations that they had been involved in 
the alleged coup continued. As the daily Dan claimed in an article published on 26 December 
2016, however, there existed ‘reasonable doubt’ that part of the evidence in the state coup case 
had not been falsified by the prosecutors. The newspaper mentioned documentation in which 
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two of the alleged conspirators (Aleksandar Sindjelić and Mirko Velimirović) are listed as 
having used the same phone number when discussing their plans, which was, the author argued, 
‘technically impossible’. 91 This was merely one controversy in what has been a long and 
somewhat bizarre legal process. The trial of the accused continued throughout 2017 and has 
not, at the time of writing, reached a conclusion.    
 
Conclusion 
Montenegro has experienced significant flux in the past two decades and has made 
significant strides since the dark days of the 1990s. Once a junior member of a federation (the 
SRJ) that was, two decades ago, an international pariah, Montenegro is now an independent 
state, a formal EU candidate, and a member of NATO. Thus, the stated objective of the DPS-
led government (in its various forms) has been partially achieved. From an external perspective 
Montenegro’s trajectory appears very positive. Internally, however, the country faces 
significant challenges. Montenegro’s independence is viewed, even among those who voted 
for it, as a DPS-led project that had, in the main, benefited members of that party and not 
Montenegrins broadly. Moreover, the ongoing internal political crisis shows little sign of 
abating, and the political environment is, perhaps, more febrile than at any stage since the 2006 
referendum. The continuing parliamentary boycott by the opposition and the upcoming trial of 
key leaders within the DF, alleged to have been involved in the ‘state coup’ attempt of October 
2016, will determine that the political environment will remain challenging for some time to 
come.   
Despite the growing dissatisfaction, however, the opposition have been unable to 
sufficiently unite to challenge the DPS, and thus Montenegro remains the only state in 
Southeastern Europe that has been governed, uninterrupted, by the same political party (albeit 
with a split within the DPS in 1997) since the first multi-party elections in 1990. There has 
been no change of government through the mechanism of democratic elections. Political 
change, such as it is, has been generated from within the DPS. The DPS is a ‘state party’ and, 
to some extent, the party is the state. The party’s well-established control over the instruments 
of state awards them a significant advantage over the opposition. Moreover, the patronage of 
those in power is crucial to employment (particularly to those who work in the public sector) 
and social advancement.  
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Amid internal splits within opposition parties and the aforementioned legal process 
against the DF, no opposition politician has yet emerged that has proved robust enough to 
mount a significant challenge to Milo Djukanović and the DPS. In fact, neither his latest 
stepping down from office heralded fundamental political change, merely a change of 
stewardship. (This was, after all, his third departure from the role of prime minister in a decade). 
On both occasions he not only chose who would succeed him, but he remained a powerful and 
influential figure within the party, albeit operating from behind the scenes. He remained the 
chairman of the DPS, giving him oversight of party developments and considerable influence 
over party matters. He has stated that he will be ‘helping’ Marković to govern Montenegro 
when his experience is called upon. Much like his departure from formal political roles in the 
past, therefore, it was unlikely that Djukanović would retreat into quiet retirement. Indeed, after 
a long delay in naming their candidate, the DPS announced that Djukanović would be their 
candidate for the presidency. He won the presidential campaign convincingly in April 2018.So 
while the last three decades have been characterised by flux (as is the contemporary political 
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